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Despite an economic recession and record levels of personal
bankruptcy filings due to health care costs, President Obama’s
health care reform initiative sparked a season of protests.1 Even a
“public option”—not to mention a single-payer system—was off
the table before the discussion really began.2 As the question of
the reform package’s constitutionality wends its way to the

†Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1
See, e.g., Sid Salter, Protesting in Boston an Old Tradition, HATTIESBURG
AMERICAN (Mar. 31, 2010), 2010 WLNR 10087997; Editors, Protests Don’t
Promote Honest Debate on Healthcare: Healthcare Reforms Tarnished By Rowdy
Protests, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 10, 2009).
2
See Angie Drobnic Holan, Public Option Was in Obama’s Platform, St.
Petersburg Times (Dec. 23, 2009), 2009 WLNR 25877888 (discussing reaction to
Obama’s backing away from the public option).
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Supreme Court,3 it has become clear that a substantial segment of
the American public does not want their government helping
them stay alive.
In this climate, it is difficult to imagine an America in which
the state is an accepted partner in meeting the challenges and
responsibilities of family life; we seem to be reflexively opposed
to the European-style social welfare state, “European-style”
being understood as a term of denigration.4 Democrats are
confounded by the public’s widespread adherence to an ideology
of liberty that conflicts with self-interest.
In The Supportive State: Families, Government, and
America’s Political Ideals,5 Maxine Eichner argues that part of
this contradiction stems from flaws in our political theory.
Modern political liberalism is premised on individual liberty as
its highest value and non-intervention as the presumptive posture
of the state.6 This theory fails to account for individual
vulnerability or collective interdependence.7 As a result,
proponents of social welfare programs lack a coherent theory of

3

Several cases have been filed challenging the constitutionality of the provision of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that requires individuals to
purchase health insurance. To date, there federal judges have concluded that this
mandate is constitutional and two have concluded that it is not. See Mead v.
Holder, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2011 WL 611139 (D.D.C. 2011) (constitutional); Fla. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., _ F.Supp.2d _, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla.
2011) (unconstitutional); Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(unconstitutional); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2010 WL
4860299 (W.D. Va. 2010) (constitutional); Thomas More L. Ctr. v. Obama, 720
F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (constitutional).
4
See, e.g., Ian Williams, The West is Red: While Rebuking “European Style
Socialism” John McCain Neglects to Mention That Europeans Enjoy a Higher
Quality of Life, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2008), 2008 WLNR 27785475, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/oct/27/tax-obamamccain-socialism (discussing John McCain’s use of the term “European style
socialism” on the campaign trail).
5
MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010).
6
See id. at 18 (describing John Rawls’s theory of justice based on two principles,
with liberty taking priority over equality).
7
See id. at 21-22 (discussing liberalism’s failure to focus on dependency).
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the state on which to rest their arguments.8 Because liberal theory
hides vulnerability and dependence inside the private “black
box” of the family, public support for vulnerability remains
exceptional and stigmatized.
The Supportive State tackles this dilemma by rethinking
liberal theory from the ground up, incorporating dependence and
families rather than pushing them to the side. It is a careful,
beautifully written renegotiation of the social contract on behalf
of real people rather than the idealized, autonomous, but isolated
rights-bearers who are the subjects of traditional liberalism.9
Eichner preserves the best of liberal theory—its jealous concern
for individual liberty, its premium on a diversity of human
flourishing—while adding the complexity that the theory needs
to cope with real lives. The result is an important contribution
both to liberalism and the feminist theory, which in the past has
focused primarily on criticizing liberalism for the failings that
Eichner corrects.
This review discusses The Supportive State from the perspective
of feminist theory and considers the extent to which Eichner has
answered the concerns of both the critics and the defenders of
liberalism. Part I describes the theoretical insights and innovations
that are the core of the book’s contribution to our understanding of
families and the state. Parts II and III raise two, related questions
about the implications of Eichner’s theoretical arguments, the
answers to which are likely to determine the degree to which her
proposal gains acceptance among feminist liberals and critics. Part II
suggests that Eichner’s proposal offers a tradeoff between
demanding that the state support families more but also justifying
increased10 state influence over certain family matters, especially sex
8

See id. at 38-43 (discussing the policy implications of the failure to take account
of dependency).
9
See id. at 3, 48-49 (describing the difference between reality and liberalism’s
moral ideal of the individual).
10
It is probably more accurate to say that the state’s influence under Eichner’s
theory would be more openly acknowledged and more principled, since, as Eichner
demonstrates, the state already pervasively influences family life. Traditional
liberalism, however, ignores rather than seeking to justify this influence. Influence
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equality within the family. This tradeoff might make her proposals
more appealing to feminist theorists who worry about the
repercussions of Eichner’s call for greater support for family
caretaking. Part III argues that although Eichner’s revised liberalism
will raise some concerns about embracing the state’s pervasive
influence on family life, it represents a major accomplishment in
developing a feminist theory of governance rather than only critique.
I. BRINGING FAMILIES INTO THE LIBERAL STATE
Eichner’s ambitious project is to reconcile liberal political
theory with feminist criticism, primarily the criticism that liberalism
treats families as anomalous and pre-political while overlooking the
important functions they serve. Liberalism focuses on the allocation
of goods among independent citizens rather than on how those goods
are brought into existence.11 It assumes a public/private split in
which families are expected to flourish autonomously, outside the
principles of justice that apply in the public realm.12 As Eichner sees
it, these errors flow in part from liberalism’s moral ideal of free and
independent citizens, which neglects with the reality of human
vulnerability and dependence.13 A more useful version of
liberalism—the supportive state—must not only acknowledge but
incorporate that reality as an essential starting point. That is exactly
what Eichner does in the first two chapters of The Supportive State,
in which she develops a revised liberal theory of politics that corrects
liberalism’s long-standing neglect of families.
A. LIBERALISM’S BLIND SPOT
It has long been apparent that “[t]he child is the Achilles heel of
liberal ideology.”14 The child challenges liberal theory because she is
is increased under Eichner’s theory as a matter of the theoretical justification, not
as a matter of the facts on the ground.
11
EICHNER, supra note 5, at 18-19 (describing John Rawls’s failure to examine
families and his assumption that children learn a sense of justice from their
families “as if it occurred in a black box”).
12
Id. at 25-26.
13
Id. at 3, 48-49.
14
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 647 (1980). See
also Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional Rights, 96 MINN. L. REV. _, _
(forthcoming 2011) (discussing children’s exclusion from liberal theory due to
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an individual and a citizen, yet not the autonomous rights-bearer who
is the subject of liberal theory. She is not yet able to exercise full
autonomy. She is in need of care and education that will inevitably
shape who she becomes and the apparently autonomous choices she
makes. She is therefore the point of vulnerability—the Achilles
heel—of a theory built on the liberty and equality of autonomous
adults.
Feminist and other political theorists have revealed the irony of
the Achilles metaphor.15 Failing to account for children—about a
quarter of the population16—is a serious problem, but the gap in
liberal theory goes deeper. Not only children are vulnerable and in
need of care. All of us depend on others for care and support to
different degrees over the course of our lives. Even those of us who
appear to most closely approximate the autonomous ideal are only an
accident away from a high degree of visible dependence. Moreover,
our inevitable dependence on others generates what Martha Fineman
calls “derivative dependency.”17 That is, the vulnerable person who
is in need of care requires a caretaker. The caretaker is thereby
limited from engaging in other kinds of work. In our society, the
expectation is that care will usually be provided and/or paid for
within the family; if the caretaker is herself a family member, her
derivative dependency will be addressed by the market activities of
other family members.18 Dependency is thus privatized within the
their lack of capacity for autonomous choice and proposing a developmental theory
for recognizing children’s constitutional rights); Stanley Ingber, Socialization,
Indoctrination, or the “Pall of Orthodoxy”: Value Training in the Public Schools,
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 19 (1987) (noting the paradox that “society must
indoctrinate children so they may be capable of autonomy”).
15
See, e.g., SUSAN MILLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989);
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2005); LINDA MCCLAIN, THE PLACE
OF FAMILIES (2006); IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (2001); MICHAEL
WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL (1999).
16
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services
Administration, Population of Children, available at
http://mchb.hrsa.gov/chusa07/popchar/pages/101pc.html (last visited 2/12/11).
17
Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 13, 20 (2000).
18
See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403,
1411 (2001).
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family—and disappears from liberal political theory. Liberalism
treats the head of the family as the autonomous individual who is the
subject of the theory, while slighting what occurs in the black box of
the family itself. Bringing families within the scope of analysis thus
reveals that vulnerability is not just in the heel: it runs throughout the
body politic. It is universal, inevitable, and inherent in the human
condition. It is a fact with which no political theory should fail to
grapple.
Eichner persuasively argues that liberalism’s failure to grapple
with vulnerability and dependency has important policy
consequences in the United States today.19 The paucity and political
fragility of our social safety net, especially as compare to those of
European nations, is well known. Eichner argues that U.S. law has
“such difficulty protecting families” precisely because it rests on the
assumptions of liberal theory “that individual liberty and equality are
the goods appropriately cognized by law,” but that “dependency is
not a condition that law needs to recognize.”20 Defenders of social
welfare programs are thus caught on their heels, without a coherent
theory on which to build their call for state support of vulnerability.
“The public philosophy by which we live cannot secure the liberty it
promises”21 because it cannot justify support for the caretaking that
is a necessary precondition to the enjoyment of liberty.

19

EICHNER, supra note 5, at 38-43 (canvassing the effects in terms of parents’ long
hours at work, to the detriment of both their children and community institutions;
high rates of child poverty; and reinforcement of sex inequality, particularly when
mothers separate from the labor market).
20
Id. at 27.
21
MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 6 (1996), quoted in EICHNER, supra note 5, at 162. Sandel’s
full statement is, “The public philosophy by which we live cannot secure the
liberty it promises, because it cannot inspire the sense of community and civic
engagement that liberty requires.” The Supportive State has strong communitarian
components, and in several places Eichner discusses the need for state to structure
institutions to better support civil society. For reasons of space and because my
focus is on The Supportive State’s place in feminist theory, the communitarian
aspects of the book receive less attention in this review.
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B. EICHNER ADJUSTS THE MIRRORS
Eichner’s starting point is liberalism’s failure, thus far, to mount
an adequate response to this criticism.22 Nonetheless, Eichner finds
much that is valuable in liberal theory. Rather than discard it entirely
for its failings, she sets out to rehabilitate it. To do so, she draws not
only on feminist criticisms but also on older strands of liberalism
that are submerged in its modern, Rawlsian form. The two main
revisions she proposes are: first, to set caretaking alongside liberty
and equality as one of the basic values of and justifications for the
state; and second, to theorize the family as a consistent and key part
of the political structure rather than as an exception to the principles
that govern in the public realm.
Classical liberalism recognized a broader range of social goods
than liberty and equality, and it recognized that social institutions
could foster civic virtue. Drawing on this tradition, Eichner argues
that, once the fact of universal vulnerability is recognized, caretaking
becomes just as important as liberty in the promotion of human
dignity.23 The state thus has a core responsibility to support the
conditions necessary for human development. Recognizing that
complete liberty is not possible, the state should nonetheless strive to
enable each of its citizens to exercise autonomy.24
This commitment to support caretaking requires a
transformation of the traditional liberal tenet that the state “must be
neutral on … the question of the good life.”25 Rather than merely
22

See EICHNER, supra note 5, at 23-25 (discussing inadequacies in John Rawls’s
response to feminist criticism and attempt to incorporate families into his theory of
justice).
23
Id. at 49 (“Reframing liberal theory to recognize the fact of dependency makes it
clear that the standard goods of liberty and equality recognized by contemporary
liberal theory are not adequate to support human dignity. The dependency inherent
in the human condition requires that caretaking and human development be added
to this list.”).
24
Eichner defines the value of autonomy as “the belief that humans should be able
to plan and pursue their own course in life. [I]t is not a condition that can simply be
assumed and respected by the state through defending an individual’s freedom to
be left alone. Instead, it is an accomplishment that can only be achieved through
complex systems of nurturance.” EICHNER, supra note 5, at 49.
25
Id.

HENDRICKS, RENEGOTIATING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

8

standing back while citizens exercise their choices and intervening
only to resolve conflicts and prevent domination, the state must
actively support the particular social good of caretaking. Using
Rawls’s test of “public reason,” Eichner argues that the state may
and should be non-neutral on the value of caretaking.26
As the primary repository of caretaking, the family is now
revealed to be a central institution of political organization, rather
than standing outside of the realm of the social contract.
Accordingly, Eichner turns to theorizing the family itself. In her
supportive state, the family’s role and responsibilities complement
those of the state. While the state is responsible for structuring social
institutions to support dependency, families are responsible for the
day-to-day work and decisions involved in caretaking. The state’s
goal should be to make it possible for families to meet their
caretaking needs “through exercising diligent but not Herculean
efforts.”27
A key strategy for meeting this goal is to protect the decisional
autonomy of families from other institutions, especially the market.
Here again, Eichner reaches for classical liberal theory, invoking the
principle that power in one realm, such as the market, should not
translate into domination of another realm, such as families. The
state must limit market coercion that interferes with families’ ability
to perform their caretaking and developmental functions. Eichner
persuasively argues that the state’s performance of this function is
critical to preserving family privacy, in the sense of decisional
autonomy, since otherwise families can be left without the ability to
make meaningful choices.28
Finally, the state must also concern itself with the internal
dynamics of families, since the decisional autonomy of a family as a
whole may be in conflict with the autonomy of individual members.
As between the adult members of a family, the state’s role is to
ensure both equal power within the family and equal opportunity to
26

Id. at 51-53 (discussing the value of caretaking under the criteria of JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 218, 223 (1993).
27
EICHNER, supra note 5, at 79.
28
Id. at 63-65.
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exit. Accordingly, Eichner pays careful attention throughout her
analysis of the state’s obligation to ensure that its support for
caretaking does not perpetuate inequality on the basis of sex.
With these guiding principles in place, Eichner proceeds to
apply the revised social contract to a series of policy questions,
ultimately producing a wide-ranging sketch of what the supportive
state would look like. She argues for a guaranteed minimum standard
of living for families with children and for work-family policies that
realistically enable families to care for their dependency needs while
protecting other social goods.29 For example, she supports generous
family leave policies but argues that each parent should be allowed a
separate, non-transferable amount of leave; this arrangement
supports caretaking but also promotes equality between parents both
at home and in the market. Eichner also addresses difficult problems
of family privacy and the rights of children within families, some of
which are discussed in Part II, below.
Eichner also addresses the dependency needs of adults. She first
discusses the needs of those who are most obviously dependent, such
as the elderly.30 She reminds the reader, however, that autonomy and
vulnerability exist not as mutually exclusive states but on a
spectrum; even those of us who most closely approximate the
autonomous ideal need caretaking too.31 She uses this insight to
resolve what she presents as the most difficult question for the
supportive state: whether and to what degree the state should
recognize and even privilege particular relationships between adults,

29

Id. at 79 (minimum standard of welfare); id. at 82-83 (work-family policies
under a public integration model, which presumes that all parents will also be
market participants).
30
Id. at 84-90 (discussing both the financial needs of the elderly and the personal
need for caretaking).
31
Id. at 101 (arguing that adults’ need for caretaking “gives the state an important
reason to support relationships between adults”).
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such as marriage.32 She concludes that, within strictly defined limits,
the state should encourage such relationships.33
The Supportive State is a masterful re-envisioning of liberal
theory to incorporate the role of families. Eichner gracefully and
methodically lays out the modifications that are needed. She then
demonstrates how the new social contract can work in practice by
applying it to difficult policy questions. Her policy conclusions are
not necessarily dictated by the theoretical framework of the
supportive state: as with any theory, the precise application of its
principles and the correct balance among competing social goods
could be debated. The most important contribution of the book is to
provide a theoretical framework that is rooted in long-accepted
political commitments to liberty while incorporating necessary
corrections to reflect the reality of interdependence. The result is a
new liberalism for the rest of us—those of us who need not just
liberty but also care and relationships to flourish in this life.
II. EXCHANGING SUPPORT FOR INFLUENCE?
Support for caretaking work, especially the work of taking care
of children, is the core of Eichner’s supportive state. Eichner
presents the supportive state as a third alternative to two extant
feminist perspectives on the state’s relationship to children and their
parents.34 One camp is represented by Martha Fineman and the other
by Mary Anne Case and Katherine Franke. Eichner disagrees with
some aspects of both theoretical perspectives, but her ultimate policy
proposals more closely resemble Fineman’s. My interest is this Part
is to explore whether other aspects of Eichner’s theory might
nonetheless make it attractive to scholars like Case and Franke, who
32

See id. at 92 (focusing on the issues of “whether civil marriage should be
retained as an institution” and “whether and how the state should seek to encourage
two-parent families over single-parent families”).
33
Id. at 104-10. The limits focusing on protecting sex equality, avoiding
stratification of wealth due to inheritance, and encouraging family engagement in
civic life rather than retreat.
34
Id. at 72-77 (discussing FINEMAN, supra note 15; Mary Anne Case, How High
the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the
Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753
(2001); Katherine Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 192-95 (2001)).
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worry that subsidizing care entrenches sex inequality by perpetuating
the gendered division of labor. I suggest that the supportive state’s
greater opportunities for promoting sex equality within the family
offer an attractive trade-off to the potential downsides of subsidizing
care.
A. THE DEBATE ABOUT SUBSIDIZING CARE
While feminists have taken a range of nuanced positions about
the state’s role with respect to family caretaking, for purposes of this
discussion it suffices to say that both Fineman and Eichner are “pro”
state support for care while Case and Franke are “against,” or at least
troubled.
Fineman has long championed the state’s obligation to support
both caretaking and caretakers. In her view, children are public
goods, and society owes a debt to those who devote their resources
to turning children into useful members of society.35 Failure to pay
this debt constitutes free-riding on the unpaid reproductive labor of
families, especially mothers. While Eichner agrees with Fineman’s
emphasis on dependency and the need to support caretaking, she is
more modest in her theoretical claims and policy proposals.36
Eichner seeks a clearer delineation between state and family
responsibility, and she sees children as public goods but also private
ones, in that the parents also benefit from the relationship.
Accordingly, although she endorses a range of family-friendly
policies, she stops short of advocating that family members be
compensated by the government for providing care.
Case and Franke object to supporting care work with public
funds on two grounds. Eichner responds effectively to the first
objection but could do more to meet the second.
First, Case argues that such support constitutes unfair favoritism
to parents. She is more inclined to see children as public liabilities
than as public goods, and she argues that parents have the primary
responsibility for meeting children’s needs.37 Like Eichner, she
35

See FINEMAN, supra note 15, at xvii.
See EICHNER, supra note 5, at 75-77 (explaining her points of disagreement with
Fiineman).
37
See Case, supra note 34, at 1785.

36
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observes that many parents have children in order to fulfill their
personal desires and visions of what constitutes a good life. Case,
however, objects to making this particular vision of the good life a
government priority. Although she does not object in theory to
government expenditures for the benefit of children themselves, she
opposes windfalls for parents.38
Eichner responds in three ways. The first is a structural critique
that there is no “neutral position” for the state that leaves children to
their parents resources in the first instance.39 The status quo could as
easily be described as actively undermining families rather than as a
neutral regime. Second, Eichner’s theoretical framework is based on
a moral argument that the state should, to a certain extent, prefer
caretaking to other activities; that is, she openly calls for revising
liberalism’s neutrality as to the good life.40 That call must succeed or
fail on its merits; I believe it succeeds. Third, if everyone agrees that
helping children would be good, Eichner pleads that the windfall to
parents is unavoidable and worth it.41
Case’s second objection, also made by Franke, is that support
for caretaking would reinforce social norms that impose motherhood
on women as their highest and most natural calling.42 Here, Eichner
responds empirically: “[W]e have long been conducting the
experiment of denying state support for parenting that Case and
Franke call for, and it has been a dismal failure for sex equality.”43
38

See id. at 1784.
EICHNER, supra note 5, at 73 (“[T]here is no neutral position in which the state
can locate itself until ‘after’ families fail.”).
40
Id. at 74.
41
Id. (noting that “children’s interests can never be neatly disentangled from
parents” but acknowledging the need for the burdens of caretaking to be distributed
equitably).
42
See Case, supra note 34, at 1756-60 (analyzing the risks of privatizing
dependency at the level of individual employers); Franke, supra note 34, at 187-88
(“The normative distinction that sets up the altruism of mothers against the
selfishness of Porsche drivers suffers from several weaknesses, not the least of
which are the confusion between the social effect of a practice and an individual's
motivation for engaging in the practice, and an impoverished account of the
meanings of and relationships between social production, social reproduction, and
consumption.”).
43
EICHNER, supra note 5, at 75.
39
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Eichner is probably right that denial of state support will not stop
most women from becoming mothers and that they will be worse off
for it. This observation, however, does not really respond to Case
and Franke’s concern about coercing women into motherhood, and it
appeals to a correlation that does not necessarily prove causation.
Perhaps other factors currently perpetuate sex inequality, but more
state support for care would entrench it further. Feminists like Case
and Franke will need an additional reason to consider embracing the
supportive state.
B. “FEMINIST FUNDAMENTALISM” AND THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE
That additional reason might be found in another aspect of
Eichner’s proposal, Bringing the family within the scope of liberal
theory means more than just recognizing and supporting the
important work that families do. It means recognizing the need for
justice within families as well as for them. For adult family
members, the state does this by promoting equality in power and in
exit opportunities. For children, the options are both more limited
and more complex. Eichner addresses three questions of family
privacy with respect to children: state intervention to protect children
from abuse and neglect44; the possibility of recognizing legal rights
by children against their parents45; and the state’s interest in ensuring
that children are educated in the liberal tradition.46 The state’s
interest in the values transmitted through education is a potential
counterweight to concerns that subsidizing care work could
undermine sex equality.
As nsoted above, Eichner is sensitive throughout her analysis to
the liberal state’s secular commitment to sex equality. This concern
resonates with Case’s commitment to what she calls “feminist
fundamentalism”: “an uncompromising commitment to the equality
of the sexes as intense and at least as worthy of respect as, for
example, a religiously or culturally based commitment to female

44

Id. at 119-25.
Id. at 126-32.
46
Id. at 133-41.
45

HENDRICKS, RENEGOTIATING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

14

subordination or fixed sex roles.”47 Case argues that the fundamental
commitment to sex equality operates as a constraint on governmental
action. For example, government should not promote marriage if
“marriage” includes a wife’s duty to obey her husband; the state may
promote only egalitarian marriage.48 Along these lines, courts have
rejected the claims of Christian fundamentalists that public education
violates their religious freedom when it endorses sex equality.49 Case
would go further, arguing that it would be unconstitutional for the
public schools to promote a non-egalitarian view of the sexes.
“State-sponsored education is not merely permitted, but also required
to refrain from promoting a message of inequality between men and
women.”50
A constraint on state action, however, can only do so much if
the family remains the realm of the private. Case’s commitment to
traditional liberalism confines her analysis to accepted moments of
governmental intervention in the family: areas such as hortatory
government policy, public education, and custody suits. These
moments, however, represent only small fragments of the replication
of sex inequality within families, a problem liberal theory struggles
to address. Although Case and a few others have argued, for
example, that a state violates the equal protection clause when it
tolerates home schooling that promotes intensely sexist values,51 the
Supreme Court has yet to recognize that a child’s ideological interest
is anything but subsumed within a claim of parental rights.52 While
47

Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between
Government and Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381, 382.
48
Id. at 391.
49
See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.
1987), discussed in Case, supra note 47, at 393.
50
Case, supra note 47, at 393; see also Jennifer S. Hendricks, Teaching Values,
Teaching Stereotypes: Sex Ed and Indoctrination in Public Schools, 13 U. PENN. J.
CONST. L. 589 (2011) ( elaborating on the question of constitutional constraints on
messages of sex inequality in public school curricula).
51
Id. (citing JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 85-86
(1998); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints
on Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 156 (2008).).
52
See, e.g., Wisc. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972) (holding that the free
exercise clause entitled Amish parents to an exemption from compulsory education
laws for high school-age children). The closest the Supreme Court has come to
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proclaiming that parents are not free “to make martyrs of their
children,”53 the Court has nonetheless restricted state intervention
until well nigh the point of martyrdom. If the parents are in
agreement about a family regime of sex inequality, the state’s
commitment to sex equality is thus constructed as opposing the
unified first amendment rights of the parent and the child. The liberal
state’s commitment to neutrality on visions of the good life leads it
to countenance and even support the rearing of children for sex
inequality.54
The supportive state, however, departs from neutrality as part of
its duty to ensure that children are capable of autonomy. It values
caretaking not just in the abstract but so that children will have the
opportunity to flourish as autonomous individuals. The supportive
state thus has a duty to ensure that children become capable of
autonomy. While Eichner argues that parents are entitled to transmit
their own values to their children, the state must ensure that
transmission does not become indoctrination, to the point at which
the children become “ethically servile” to their parents.55
Liberalism’s protection for the parents’ autonomy need not extend to
allowing them to thwart the development of the children’s own
autonomy.56 The state should therefore use other institutions, with as

have to acknowledge the conflict between a child’s autonomy and a parent’s claim
of parental rights was in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004), the challenge to the inclusion of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance
as recited in California public schools. The plaintiff’s daughter and her mother
opposed the lawsuit. The Supreme Court avoided the merits through a questionable
ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing because the child’s other parent had legal
custody and thus was the only person entitled to bring suit on her behalf.
53
Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
54
See Case, supra note 47, at 401-06 (discussing the decision of Texas courts to
return a group of children to their parents in a fundamentalist LDS colony that
indoctrinated children of both sexes in the extreme subordination of women).
55
EICHNER, supra note 5, at 138; see also id. at 137 (“Liberalism does not allow
one person to serve simply as a pawn to satisfy another’s life plan, even when the
other person is a parent.”).
56
Id. at 138.
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little intrusion as possible on families themselves, to ensure that
children are adequately exposed to liberal values.57
The duty to support caretaking and the opportunity to ensure the
capacity for autonomy are intertwined in the supportive state, so that
accepting (or rejecting) one entails accepting (or rejecting) the other.
Support for caretaking is based on the state’s duty to enable the child
and the caretaker to flourish, which is also the duty that underlies
intervention in matters of education. The supportive state’s
resolution of the “Achilles heel” problem not only allows it to see
into liberalism’s blind spot (the family) but also to apply liberal
values to what goes on there. Support for caretaking raises fewer
concerns, in terms of its tendency to entrench gender roles, if it
comes with increased opportunities for the state to foster egalitarian
norms.
III. COUNTING ON THE BENEVOLENT STATE?
While the supportive state’s greater ability to foster egalitarian
norms may be attractive, it also raises an additional question about
Eichner’s model. The supportive state is, still, the state, which is
traditionally an object of suspicion for both liberalism and critical
theory.58 Feminists, in particular, have recently struggled with
questions about how to move from critique to governance as feminist
ideas gain traction within legal institutions.59 Eichner’s move to a
theory of governance entails a certain level of trust in the capacity of
the state to be a force for good. To some, the supportive state will
57

For example, Eichner proposes that rather than ban home schooling that
inculcates sexist values, the state could require attendance at an after-school
program that promotes egalitarian values. Id. at 137.
58
See, e.g., Alice Ristroph and Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119
YALE L.J. 1236, 1272-73 (2010) (arguing that the family should not be theorized
from the perspective of the state, so that regulations of the family are designed
according to what is in the state’s interest).
59
Most prominently, Janet Halley has criticized “governance feminism” as one of
the reasons to “take a break” from feminism. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Prabha
Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas, From the International to the
Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminsim, 29 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 335 (2006); JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE
A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006).

HENDRICKS, RENEGOTIATING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

17

appear prone to the sort of paternalism that can too easily turn to
authoritarianism. The strength of Eichner’s theoretical framework,
however, lies in her creation of a legitimate supportive role for the
state while simultaneously retaining at least as much protection for
individual autonomy, in the traditional sense, as we have today. The
supportive state thus represents the first explicit and successful
attempt to reconcile feminist critique into a theory of the governing
state.
As an example of the complex obligations of the supportive
state, consider the prosecution of domestic violence. Under the
traditional liberal model, violence within the family was “private,”
and state intervention was presumptively inappropriate. A great deal
of feminist effort has gone into demonstrating the inadequacy and
injustice of this response.60 Treating the family as a “black box”
allows for domination within it. Instead, the state must recognize the
rights—and the claims to justice—of the individuals within the
family.
Using such arguments, feminist activists have been remarkably
successful in persuading many law enforcement authorities that
domestic violence is a crime. In places, legal institutions have
accepted the proposition that an assault is an assault, no matter the
relationship between the assailant and the victim.61 Moreover, an
assault is a crime not only against the victim but also against the
public order. This new perspective has led to a different problem for
feminists: prosecution policies that disregard the wishes of the
victim.62 Once domestic violence victims win the right to call the
police into the home, it seems they often lose the right to demand
that they leave.

60

See generally Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for
Sure?, 23 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 7, 9-10, 13-14 (2004) (summarizing the
development of legal responses to domestic violence since the 1970s).
61
See id. at 13-15.
62
See id. at 15-19 (describing the development of mandatory arrest and no-drop
prosecution policies) see also Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An AntiEssentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37
FLA. ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (“The autonomy of women who have been battered is
the price of these policies.”).
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When I discuss domestic violence cases with my students, they
are remarkably unsympathetic to a victim of domestic violence who
wants the police to help her in an emergency but who also wants to
preserve her relationship, whether for reasons of love, money, or
other inter-dependence. They believe that she has a right to call the
police if a crime is committed but should not be allowed to keep the
policy “on call” while simultaneously returning to the relationship
and refusing to cooperate with prosecution. They are vague about
how the victim should address the factors that are keeping her
attached to the relationship. Their arguments reflect the view that
state involvement in the relationship is anomalous and should be
discrete and contained.
By contrast, many domestic violence advocates see the problem
differently and believe that domestic assaults need to be treated
differently from other crimes—still seriously, but differently.63
Aggressive prosecution may serve the needs of victims less well than
emergency protection backed up by a range of other social services.
Those services might give a victim of domestic violence the ability
to leave the relationship, and the shift in power created by her ability
to leave might also make it more feasible to stay.
Here, the supportive state dovetails nicely with the changes
sought by activists on the ground. Because the supportive state has a
theory of families, it neither treats the family as a “black box” nor
tries to shoe-horn family relationships into other paradigms, such as
a perpetrator and victim who are strangers to each other. Instead, it
provides a framework for supporting the victim and enabling her
autonomy. The supportive state would respect a decision to preserve
the relationship while also doing all it could to ensure that this
decision was truly autonomous because the means existed to exit.
The state would attempt to meet the needs of both the victim and the
perpetrator. For example, it might provide support resources of
various kinds to the victim and mental health services to the
perpetrator.

63

See Goodmark, supra note 60, at 45-48 (arguing for a broader spectrum of
responses to domestic violence, within and beyond the legal system).
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This approach has resonance with another advocacy movement,
known as the therapeutic jurisprudence movement. Proponents of
therapeutic jurisprudence believe that legal institutions should
interact with individuals holistically rather than focusing on a
discrete incident.64 For example, a criminal charge can be an
opportunity for the state to intervene with respect to the underlying
causes of the person’s criminal inclinations. Under therapeutic
jurisprudence, the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, the judge, and
social services providers should work together as a team to make a
positive difference in the person’s life.
Somewhat idealistic, even utopian, in its outlook, therapeutic
jurisprudence is subject to criticism by those who represent the
people the state wants to “help.”65 The sincere desire to help at some
level can mask the power dynamics at work: the state still holds the
trump card of coercion. While people accused of crimes are often in
need of a variety of social services, tying those services to the
moment of intervention by the criminal justice system is rarely in
their interest. The goal of a criminal defense lawyer is more likely to
be to remove the coercive arm of the state out of her client’s life as
quickly as possible, while looking elsewhere for the means to
improve that life.66
The supportive state may often find itself in a similar position:
trying to be a friend while standing ready to use force. For example,
Eichner reviews the abysmal condition of our current child welfare
system and argues that the supportive state would replace the
emergency-oriented foster care system with long-term support
services for families; it would alleviate the poverty that is the root
64

See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOS. L. REV. 743, 743-45 (2005)
(introducing the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence in the context of criminal
defense; id. at 747-52 (discussing the criminal defense lawyer’s role during the
course of representation).
65
See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Invitation: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly)
Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539 (2007).
66
See id. at 574-75, 578-79 (describing the defense lawyer’s involvement with
social services for the client and the risks of accepting court-supervised services,
especially those that are available only after a guilty plea).
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cause of many problems that are treated as abuse or neglect; and it
would reduce the instances of the ultimate intervention, removing a
child from her home.67 It would do so not just as a response to
families in crisis but as part of its overall mission of supporting the
caretaking efforts of all families.
It is not clear, however, that a broader program of support
would mean that the traditional objects of state coercion would be
less coerced, or if the rest of us would face increased coercion as the
price of support. Indeed, I have suggested above that the supportive
state’s ability to mildly coerce adherence to egalitarian gender norms
is an attractive feature. Nonetheless, it is not only the Tea Party that
becomes nervous at such a prospect. To many, the supportive state
will appear to be too deeply involved in family life for comfort.
Eichner would respond that this level of involvement does not
alter the status quo. The state is already deeply involved in shaping
our family lives. By bringing that involvement out into the open, the
supportive state would allow us to ponder that involvement with
greater clarity and make conscious rather than implicit choices about
it. Because the state’s influence will be pervasive in any event, we
should at least aspire to make it a positive force, and we should have
a framework for talking about what it ought to be doing. The state is
already intervening, and intervening badly; we need a new
framework to see how it could do better.
In addition, Eichner would modify very little about family
privacy as we know it today; she is as jealous of family autonomy as
she is concerned for individual flourishing. She is opposed to
parental consent requirements for reproductive and mental health
services, but she would otherwise keep parental authority intact.68
Her ultimate goal for the child welfare system is to keep families
intact for the long term rather than to quickly decide they have failed
and sever their ties.69 Even in the realm of education, where she
acknowledges the state’s right and duty to ensure that children
67

See EICHNER, supra note 5, at 119 (“Instead of strong-arming families after a
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receive a liberal education, she advocates methods that intrude as
little as possible on competing values that parents may wish to
transmit.70
Ultimately, however, the case for the supportive state rests on a
strain of optimism that runs throughout the book—optimism about
our capacities both individually and collectively. Unlike Holmes,
Eichner would not design the state from the perspective of the “bad
man”71; she is designing it for the rest of us. Her theory of parental
authority, for example, is based on the premise that “most parents at
most times” will sacrifice for the sake of their children.”72 If the
subject of traditional liberalism is the idealized autonomous adult,
Eichner’s subject is different not merely because she is vulnerable
and interdependent but also because she is presumed to value her
relationships and to aspire to fulfill the obligations that arise from
interdependency. Eichner presents society as consisting not of selfinterested individuals who are out to get the most they can from
others but of people who are doing their best to meet society’s
expectations of them.
Some of this optimism about human nature necessarily carries
over into optimism about human ability to act collectively through
the state. Developing a theory of the state necessarily entails
imagining some sort of positive role for it to play. Feminism can try
to remain entirely a theory of criticism, or it can get to work on
developing its theory of governance. If this is what governance
feminism looks like, I’ll take it.
CONCLUSION
The Supportive State is an ambitious and beautifully
executed reconstruction of political liberalism. It demonstrates
that the liberal value of autonomy is not only preserved but
strengthened when realities of vulnerability and dependence are
70

Id. at 136-37.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) (“If
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but see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 39 (1961) (“Why should not law be
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taken into account. Implicitly, it calls upon theorists to embrace
rather than avoid the complexity of people’s lives, and it calls on
activists to develop a long-term, coherent vision of the role of the
state rather than try to shoehorn the policies of a supportive state
into the ideology of an aloof one. Like any theory that imagines a
positive role for the state, the supportive state requires a careful
balance between collective and individual decision-making.
Eichner strikes that balance brilliantly, producing a framework
that should guide anyone who is interested in bringing the family
and its caretaking functions out of the black box and into the
realm of justice.
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